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M. he significance of the Federal Re-
serve System's reserve requirements has
been fading for the last 50 years, moving
toward more universal application at less
onerous rates. At the outbreak of World
War n, the requirements applied only to
national banks and to state-chartered
banks that chose to be members of the
System. These institutions had to hold
non-interest-bearing deposits at a Re-
serve Bank equal to 14 to 26 percent (de-
pending on the bank's location) of their
transaction deposit liabilities plus 3 per-
cent of their time deposits. This was in
addition to coin and currency that banks
kept in their own vaults.
Today, reserve requirements apply to
all depository financial institutions
(DFIs).
1 The requirement is only zero
to 10 percent of transactions deposits
(depending on the amount of a bank's
deposits) and zero on time deposits,
with vault cash considered just as good
as non-interest-bearing deposits in
meeting the requirement.
Where will it all end? Most likely, re-
serve requirements will continue to fade
away until the cost of meeting the require-
ment no longer acts as a siren song for
avoidance. In the meantime, the search
for alternatives goes on. This Economic
Commentary examines the decline of re-
serve requirements and the recent flower-
ing of required clearing balances — a
relatively new and rapidly growing fea-
ture of Federal Reserve Bank operations
that has the appearance of a substitute for
reserve requirements. Upon closer inspec-
tion, however, the required clearing bal-
ance arrangement provides an uncertain
alternative, at least as constrained by
existing law.
• The Reserve Requirement Tax
Reserve requirements tax DFIs by forc-
ing them to hold non-interest-bearing
cash. The "bite" of the requirement, or
the net tax, comes from the need to
hold more cash than ordinary business
needs would dictate.
One clear business need is to hold
enough coin and currency to stock hu-
man and automated teller stations.
Less clear is the need to hold any sig-
nificant deposit balance at a Federal Re-
serve Bank. An account relationship
with a Reserve Bank is important for
clearing and settling paper and elec-
tronic payments involving other banks
and the Treasury. However, actually
maintaining a balance at the Fed means
leaving funds in an account at the close
of a day's business to sit idle overnight.
A DFI might just as easily maintain a
zero balance, earning interest by wiring
funds out for overnight investment near
the close of business each day.
Perhaps the only reason to keep a sub-
stantial voluntary balance in a Fed ac-
count overnight would be to ensure an
opening balance large enough to avoid
a temporary ("daylight") overdraft
when making payments the next morn-
ing. In the absence of reserve require-
ments, the alternative to holding an
overnight balance at the Fed would be
to use private systems for making and
clearing payments. A reserve balance
avoids these costs, in effect reducing
the net tax of reserve requirements.
The fading significance of the Federal
Reserve System's reserve require-
ments has highlighted the search for
alternatives. Required clearing bal-
ances, introduced in 1981, perform
much the same functions as reserve
requirements, but offer banks the pos-
sibility of earning an implicit market
rate of return. However, with their
volume dependent on both sales of
Federal Reserve priced services and
the level of short-term interest rates,
required clearing balances provide
only an uncertain alternative to re-
serve requirements. Paying explicit in-
terest, whether on reserves or clearing
balances, would ensure a more pre-
dictable system.
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ments apparently still impose some net
tax on many DFIs. In a market setting,
these institutions need some offsetting
special advantage if they are to compete
successfully with firms that are not sub-
ject to the same requirement. In the his-
torical case of banking, those advantages
might include exclusive rights to make
commercial loans and to provide pay-
ment services with deposits, as well as
government restrictions on the number of
competing bank charters and direct ac-
cess to the lender of last resort.
But no offsetting advantage will elimi-
nate the two-pronged incentive to
avoid the reserve requirement tax.
DFIs have a continuing incentive to
minimize reservable liabilities by de-
signing new methods of financing that
qualify for a lower reserve require-
ment. Non-DFIs have an incentive to
imitate the special features of banking
while avoiding the tax.
• Evolution of the Fed's
Reserve Requirements
Changes in the structure of the Fed's re-
serve requirements over the last 80
years reflect the incentive for avoid-
ance. In 1917, member banks were re-
quired to maintain reserves that varied
by type of deposit and location of bank.
A three-way location classification, car-
ried over from previous federal require-
ments for national banks, reflected the
unit-banking environment of the early
twentieth century. Blinking markets
could be defined geographically, and
membership in the Federal Reserve
System was apparently thought to con-
fer special advantages that were more
valuable, the more dense was the con-
centration of population and industry
near a bank's offices. Requirements
were highest (13 percent) in "central re-
serve cities," including New York, Chi-
cago, and (briefly) St. Louis. They
were intermediate (10 percent) in about
50 other large urban centers, called "re-
serve cities," and lowest (7 percent) in
the remaining locations, where smaller
state-chartered "country" banks were
likely to be ambivalent about the advan-
tages of membership in the System.
Reserve ratios had doubled for each loca-
tion category by the mid-thirties, but the
drift from unit to branch banking in the
postwar period created a growing threat
that banks could avoid high reserve ratios.
That is, as fast as the Fed might redefine
the boundaries of reserve cities, banks
might redesignate country bank branches
as head offices. The size of a bank's de-
posits officially replaced location in deter-
mining reserve ratios in 1972, when
banks were designated country banks —
regardless of location — if they had de-
posits of less than $400 million. All
larger member banks were classified as
reserve city banks and faced higher re-
serve ratios.
By 1980, two other distinctions had be-
come the focus of reserve requirement
avoidance. First, member banks faced
the Fed's reserve requirements, while
nonmember banks faced only state re-
serve requirements, which were typi-
cally less onerous. Even some very
large banks were withdrawing from the
Federal Reserve System because of the
cost disadvantage of membership. Sec-
ond, banks and nonbank thrift institu-
tions were developing deposit products
that competed favorably in the house-
hold market with commercial banks'
transactions accounts — without being
subject to the high reserve ratio for
those accounts.
The Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980
responded to these two forces. All
member and nonmember banks, and all
bank and nonbank depository institu-
tions, became subject to Federal Re-
serve reserve requirements, graduated
by the size of an institution's deposit
base. The upshot is that all DFIs in the
United States now compete within the
same structure of reserve requirements.
Nonetheless, all must still compete with
foreign DFIs and with non-DFIs that
are not subject to reserve requirements
(such as mutual funds and life insurance
companies) as well as with direqt issues
of securities. It is no accident, then, that
the recent reductions in reserve require-
ments have focused on improving the
ability of depository institutions to lend.
• Would We Miss Them
If They Were Gone?
Today, federal reserve requirements are
at their lowest levels since the Civil
War.
3 Many thousands of small DFIs
(hereafter, simply "banks") and even
some relatively large commercial
banks face no net tax, either because
they have a zero requirement or be-
cause they more than meet their re-
quirement with vault cash needed for
routine business.
Why not reduce the tax on the remain-
ing affected banks by lowering the
transactions deposit ratio from 10 per-
cent to the statutory minimum of 8 per-
cent, or perhaps even eliminate the tax
completely by legislative action? Reluc-
tance centers around the potential
evaporation of banks' deposits at the
Fed. That is, while voluntary holdings
of vault cash might be little different
from current holdings, what would be-
come of the inventory of immediately
transferable cash available to banks for
their own use or for lending in the over-
night federal funds market?
If the effect of lower reserve require-
ments were simply to reduce the inven-
tory of Fed deposits, two problems
could arise. Interest-rate signals from
monetary policy would become less
clear because the federal funds rate
would become more volatile in the ab-
sence of an inventory of cash upon
which markets could draw. Alterna-
tively, monetary targeting would be-
come less precise if the Fed were to
adopt a reserves-based approach to tar-
geting money. Second, without any in-
ventory for payors to draw on directly
or through borrowing in the money
market, risk exposure would increase
in the payment system. Payment delays
or defaults would be more likely to
bring the payment system to a halt as
banks sought to negotiate settlements.
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a. Required balances equal required reserve balances plus required clearing balances.
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Monetary policy implementation and
payment system risk are important mat-
ters, but there are ways to compensate
for lack of an inventory of immediately
available funds. For example, banks in
the United Kingdom have operated
with no reserve requirements and with
virtually no balances at the central
bank for over a decade. Instead, the
Bank of England engages in frequent
open-market operations to provide a
"just-in-time" source of funds.
6 Like-
wise, the Canadian banking system is
currently adjusting to the elimination
of reserve requirements. In this new
framework, the Bank of Canada makes
direct loans or advances that ensure a
just-in-time source of funds to institu-
tions needing to cover temporary defi-
cits in their cash positions.
Furthermore, removing reserve require-
ments may have a more limited effect on
banks' demand for balances in the United
States, even though the British and Cana-
dians have learned to live without an in-
ventory of immediately available funds.
After all, in addition to vault cash, only
about $27 billion of the $34 billion of
bank balances at Reserve Banks is re-
quired reserve balances. The remaining
$7 billion includes about $1 billion of ex-
cess reserves as well as $6 billion of
required clearing balances. These bal-
ances have grown rapidly enough to
offset almost two-thirds of the $6 bil-
lion decline in required reserve bal-
ances that has taken place over the last
three years (see figure 1).
• Clearing Balance Requirements
About 5,000 banks now maintain re-
quired clearing balances at the Federal
Reserve Banks. These range from
small retail depositories with a $25,000
minimum requirement to giant money
center institutions with clearing bal-
ance requirements of several hundred
million dollars. These requirements dif-
fer from reserve requirements in three
significant ways. First, a bank's agree-
ment to meet the requirement is typi-
cally a business decision, not a legal
necessity. Second, the amount of the re-
quirement is unrelated to the amount of
a bank's deposit liabilities. And third,
the rate of return on a clearing balance
can be about equal to the federal funds
rate, not zero, if the bank uses its earn-
ings to pay for services it buys from a
Federal Reserve Bank.
A bank may have either or both of two
motivations for holding a required
clearing balance. One is to save money
on priced services purchased from a Re-
serve Bank. This saving is possible if
the bank can maintain a positive spread
between the earnings credit rate re-
ceived on its clearing balance and the
average rate it pays for funds invested
in the clearing balance. The earnings
credit rate is based on the average of all
the rates at which overnight federal
funds trade in the market each day.
These rates can include quality spreads,
day-of-the-week effects, and other
anomalies. Thus, a high-quality bank
with confidence in its ability to "buy
low and sell high" in the funds market
might expect to earn a positive spread
on a required clearing balance.
A second and more fundamental reason
for banks to maintain a required clear-
ing balance is to reduce the possibility
of account overdrafts. The Reserve
Banks penalize overnight overdrafts at
a 10 percent annual rate (or higher) and
are moving toward a regime of explicit
fees for excessive daylight overdrafts,
starting in April 1994. Moreover, even
if penalties and fees don't induce a bank
to hold a larger balance, a ReserveBank may insist that it do so as a
Q
means of overdraft protection.
In many respects, a required clearing
balance is comparable to the traditional
compensating balance that a respondent
bank or commercial customer might
maintain with its bank. A bank reaches
an agreement with its Reserve Bank about
the average balance it will maintain
during a required reserve maintenance
period, in addition to any required re-
serve balance and allowable carryover
of a surplus or deficiency. At the end of
the period, the bank is penalized if its
actual maintained balance, net of what-
ever amount is needed to satisfy its re-
serve requirement, has fallen short of
the required clearing balance by more
than a penalty-free band. On the other
hand, the bank receives earnings cred-
its on the amount by which its main-
tained balance has exceeded the amount
needed to satisfy the reserve require-
ment, up to the required clearing bal-
ance plus the penalty-free band.
These earnings credits accumulate for
use in offsetting charges for priced serv-
ices, but expire after 52 weeks.''
• A Potential Replacement
for Reserve Requirements?
Basing a bank's reserve requirement on
payment system activity rather than on its
deposit base is not a new idea. What's
different about the required clearing bal-
ance arrangement, in addition to earnings
credits, is the potential link between the
size of a bank's required clearing balance
and the account overdrafts it would other-
wise generate. Overdrafts are one indica-
tor of a bank's contribution to payment
system risk, and required clearing balances
reduce this risk. Of course, a bank can
avoid a required clearing balance, but
only by shifting its payment business
from the Fed to correspondent banks, or
directly to either private payment net-
works or private same-day wire transfer
networks such as CHIPS.
Replacing reserve requirements with re-
quired clearing balances could be safe,
then, as long as all the private alterna-
tives had risk protections equivalent to
those required by the Fed — a reasonable
expectation, since the Fed has regulatory
authority over payment-system-risk as-
pects of private networks. Equivalence
of the cost of risk protection, however,
might be impossible to achieve because
of earnings credits. For example, the
CHIPS network limits each participat-
ing bank's use of daylight credit in
much the same way that the Fed limits
daylight overdrafts. In addition, CHIPS
requires participants to maintain a set-
tlement guarantee fund invested in
earnings assets whose income benefits
participants.
A required clearing balance differs
from participation in the CHIPS guar-
antee fund in one crucial respect. The
positive return on required clearing bal-
ances is realized only through a bank's
use of the Fed's priced services. There
is no mechanism to ensure that charges
for the priced services a bank wants to
buy will exhaust the earnings credits
the bank receives on its required clear-
ing balance. Unused earnings credits
do reduce prices of the Fed's services,
because such credits are deducted from
the costs of production. But an individ-
ual bank will see balances that earn un-
used credits as no different from the
net tax of reserve requirements. The
problem is simply that the Federal Re-
serve Banks cannot pay explicit inter-
est on the balances that banks hold
with them.13
It is true that, in the aggregate, earnings
credits don't exhaust charges for Re-
serve Banks' priced services. If this
were also true of each individual bank,
there might be room to replace required
reserve balances with required clearing
balances. However, the aggregate statis-
tic masks substantial variation among
individual banks. A study of banks in
the New York Federal Reserve District
found a tendency toward a bipolar dis-
tribution of large institutions.' One
group placed little or no reliance on re-
quired clearing balances to pay for
priced services and therefore could
profitably add to required clearing bal-
ances in place of required reserves.
The other group was already relying
heavily on earnings credits, holding
close to the "maximum useful balance"
at which charges for priced services ex-
haust earnings credits. All else equal,
these banks would be no better off re-
placing required reserve balances with
required clearing balances, because they
would be unable to realize the income po-
1 tential of additional earnings credits.
An important unanswered question is,
would these "exhausted" banks in-
crease their use of Fed priced services
in order to realize income on clearing
balances, or would they increase their
use of private priced services to avoid
the need for so large a clearing bal-
ance? Equally important, note that over-
draft protection is inversely propor-
tional to the level of the federal funds
rate. Charges for the Fed's priced serv-
ices totaled about $750 million in
1992. If all of these charges had been
paid with earnings credits when the
funds rate was 3 percent, banks would
have had to hold $25 billion of re-
quired clearing balances. But if the
funds rate had risen to 6 percent, banks
would have needed balances of only
$12.5 billion.
• Concluding Comment
It seems indisputable that a payment
system and a financial system are safer
and less volatile when banks hold more
rather than less cash. But how can that
safety be encouraged? The imperma-
nence of reserve requirements results
from their net tax, which acts as an in-
centive for avoidance. Those subject to
the tax search for ways to get around it
even while those not subject to the tax
search for ways to compete tax-free.
Required clearing balances show some
promise as a replacement for reserve re-
quirements. They too can encourage
banks to hold balances of immediately
available funds as a cushion to fall
back on when payments are unexpect-
edly delated. The availability of this '
cash fund helps to ensure both a safe
flow of payments and a stable mone-
tary policy signal in the money market.Banks hold a relatively small amount
of clearing balances today. The impor-
tant question, however, is how they
might respond to further reductions in
reserve requirements. The ability to
earn a market rate of interest would
make required clearing balances an at-
tractive option for institutions seeking
to avoid overdrafts, especially with the
anticipated introduction of charges for
daylight overdrafts this year. However,
as matters now stand, the Reserve
Banks cannot pay explicit interest on
required clearing balances, but only
earnings credits against charges for
priced services.
Especially in times of high interest rates,
a bank may need to maintain a balance
on which earnings credits exceed charges
for priced services. Under these circum-
stances, the future of required clearing
balances is not clear. If banks were to
shift their patronage away from private
providers of payment services and to the
Reserve Banks, increased charges would
be covered by otherwise unused earnings
credits. Just as plausibly, shifting patron-
age away from the Reserve Banks and to
private providers might reduce the size of
the clearing balance required.
Paying explicit interest, whether on re-
serves or clearing balances, would en-
sure a more predictable system.
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